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ABSTRACT 
 
The two aims of this thesis are as follows: first, to gain an understanding of the health-conflict 
literature and to create an analytical framework and second, to apply this framework to Kenya’s 
2007-2008 post-election violence. A comprehensive search of PubMed and the grey literature 
was conducted to inform both of these aims. The devastating health outcomes of violent civil 
conflict tend to be concentrated in vulnerable populations: children, adolescents and women. The 
health outcomes of violent civil conflict can be divided into four categories: economic and 
infrastructural, environmental, policy and social. Examples of these health outcomes include a 
cholera outbreak, low birthweight, interruptions in ART adherence and Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD).  
The most common population level measures of these impacts are Health-Adjusted Life 
Expectancy (HALE), Disability-Adjusted Life-Years (DALYs) and the Dirty War Index (DWI). 
Retrospective surveys, census data, eyewitness accounts and media reporting are the sources of 
data for these tools and despite having specific limitations that must be considered before use, 
are the best available measures. In addition to this, there is a stark absence of new data in the 
field, denying it the proper attention by the international community. The 2007-2008 post-
election violence in Kenya and its impact on health outcomes provides a real world example of 
public health relevance. Moving forward, conflict epidemiologists will play a vital role in 
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expanding available research in this field, helping to bring this field into the international 
community’s consciousness and ensure that necessary emergency preparedness plans are in place 
to mitigate any negative health outcomes among vulnerable populations.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Keeping in mind Gardemann’s (2002) eight characteristics of public health(1):  
“1) public health is peace promoting; 2) public health is reconciliation; 3) public health is 
democratic; 4) public health is border-crossing; 5) public health is worthwhile; 6) public 
health is preventative; 7) public health is based on science, skills and values; and 8) 
public health is a ray of hope.” (p.152-153)                    
 
there are two aims of this thesis. The first aim is to gain an understanding of the literature and the 
health outcomes of violent civil conflict. This will aid in the creation of an analytical framework 
detailing the impacts of violent civil conflict on health outcomes using a public health 
perspective and an ecological focus. The second aim will be to apply this framework to the 
politically contentious setting of Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence of 2007-2008 and its 
related health outcomes. 
Approximately 310,000 deaths were caused by conflict in the year 2000 with more than 
half occurring in sub-Saharan Africa(2). Multiple researchers have found that the largest number 
of conflict deaths occurred among children and adolescents, but that nearly 25 percent of deaths 
were among women(2, 3). Excess deaths of males between the ages of 15 and 44(2) also impact 
the working age population’s productivity. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated 
that 0.70 percent of the global burden of disease in the year 2000 was due to conflict(2). Since 
this places conflict-related deaths well below other burdens, it is not considered a high priority 
by the international community. However, this is a mistake because of the many health outcomes 
of violent civil conflict that persist for years, or are not apparent until years after the conflict(3).        
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An upcoming field that is entirely focused on providing “science-based estimates of 
the…costs of war” on health is conflict epidemiology(4). Conflict epidemiologists focus on 
“relatively acute situations affecting large civilian populations, usually involving a combination 
of war or civil strife, food shortages and population displacement, resulting in significant excess 
mortality(4).” Thoms and Ron (2007) conduct retrospective mortality surveys using verbal 
autopsies among the refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) populations(4). To further 
prioritize the link between human rights, conflict and International Humanitarian Law, conflict 
epidemiology needs to collaborate with public health researchers, conflict analysts and human 
rights monitors (4). 
While the most immediate health outcome of violent civil conflict is death, there are a 
variety of under-studied medium and long-term health outcomes(3), which can be divided into 
four categories: infrastructural and economic, environmental, policy and social(5, 6). WHO 
defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity(7).” Using this definition, it becomes clear that violent civil 
conflict impedes the achievement of health. For this reason, this thesis’ primary focus will be on 
these medium and long-term health outcomes as they offer a more comprehensive picture of 
health after violent civil conflict ends.  
Healthy Life Expectancy (HALEs) and Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) are the 
main methods used to measure these health outcomes. The Dirty War Index is another method, 
but it serves a different purpose by measuring the belligerence of war. Retrospective surveys, 
census data, eyewitness accounts and media reporting are the sources of data for these methods, 
and while not perfect, are the best sources currently available.   
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 This thesis brings together the frameworks and methods of the wide ranging health-
conflict field and applies them to a single country – Kenya, at a specific point in the country’s 
history – the 2007-2008 post-election violence, and examines the specific health outcomes 
related to that point in time – a cholera outbreak, low birthweight, interruptions in ART 
adherence, and mental health issues such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. This unique approach 
attempts to create a bridge between the field’s frameworks and focus it on a single instance of 
violent civil conflict. This is a novel approach because most literature in this field does not focus 
on a single conflict, but rather on a conglomeration of them.  
This thesis will begin by defining violent civil conflict and continue with a description of 
this theoretical framework’s methodology. Next, the results of aim one’s literature review will be 
discussed in detail, which includes the impacts of violent civil conflict on health outcomes, the 
commonly used population level measures of these health outcomes, their limitations and 
existing gaps in data. After that, aim two’s results will be examined, which includes an 
introduction to Kenya, its healthcare system, and a brief political history. The case study then 
delves into the 2007-2008 post-election violence and its aftermath by province and on population 
level health outcomes. Following this will be a discussion of the case study’s limitations, with a 
final discussion and conclusion section wrapping up everything.  
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2.0  DEFINING VIOLENT CIVIL CONFLICT 
Violent civil conflict may be referred to as civil conflict, civil war, civil strife, violence or 
conflict and is also defined in a variety of ways. According to Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 
(2004), violent civil conflicts “are armed conflicts that challenge the sovereignty of an 
internationally recognized state and occur within that state’s boundary, resulting in 1,000 or 
more fatalities in at least one year(8).” Using this definition, Kenya’s post-election violence 
qualifies as violent civil conflict and merits study.   
Zwi (2004) writes that violent civil conflict is driven by politics and economics(9). He 
states that violent civil conflict(9): 
“[1] occur(s) within and across state boundaries, [2] ha(s) political antecedents 
typically relating to competition for power and resources, [3] (is) protracted in 
duration, [4] express(es) existing social, political, economic, and cultural 
structures and cleavages, and [5] (is) often characterized by one sector preying on 
other parts of the community.” (p.033) 
 
When violent civil conflict has become politicized, there are three groups: the winners, the 
“conflict entrepreneurs” and the losers(9). Conflict entrepreneurs seek to “perpetrate (the) 
conflict because they profit economically or politically(9).” Keeping these conditions and groups 
in mind, it becomes easier to break down a complex situation and objectively look at its 
individual components and health outcomes.   
 Zwi  and Ugalde (1989) include tribal and ethnic rivalries, intense nationalism, religious 
intolerance, uncompromising political ideologies, despotism and racism as part of their definition 
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of violent civil conflict(10). Violence is used to ensure one’s will is achieved, particularly when 
loss of control is at risk(10). Another aspect of violent civil conflict they discuss is its 
organization. Organized violence is defined as “the inter-human infliction of significant, 
avoidable pain and suffering by an organized group according to a declared or implied strategy 
and/or system of ideas and attitudes(10).”  
 The research and analysis of the consequences of conflict from a public health 
perspective is vital. Coupland (2005) explains the need well by writing that “analyzing armed 
violence from a health perspective carries the advantage that it permits generic and objective 
consideration of the effects of armed violence on its victims – frequently a consideration driven 
by emotion…(11).” He also writes that since the WHO definition of health “encompasses a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being, it is both logical and intuitive that people’s 
security, whether viewed collectively or at an individual level is necessary but not sufficient for 
their health(12).” 
 For the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant definition of violent civil conflict is the 
one offered by Ghobarah, Huth and Russett (2004) (5). The 2007-2008 post-election violence 
challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, Kenya; occurred within 
Kenya’s boundaries and resulted in between 1,133 and 1,200 deaths from December 27, 2007 to 
February 28, 2008, which is less than a year’s time. Looking at this definition from a public 
health perspective allows for a unique analysis of the impacts of violent civil conflict on health 
outcomes. 
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3.0  METHODS 
This thesis’ first aim was to gain an understanding of the health-conflict field, which was 
completed through a comprehensive literature review. The literature review began with the 
bibliography section of the article “Protection of health care in armed and civil conflict: 
Opportunities for breakthroughs” by Leonard Rubenstein (2012)(13). The key words used during 
the examination of the bibliography included healthcare, armed conflict and civil conflict. After 
compiling a couple of articles through citation chaining, a thorough search of the grey literature 
published by the ICRC was conducted. The author focused on studies and grey literature that 
were health-oriented, in that they started with health outcomes and moved backwards, rather than 
beginning with conflict and ending with health outcomes. Following this, Barbara Folb, MM, 
MLS, MPH; the Public Health Informationist for the Graduate School of Public Health, was 
consulted. With her help, comprehensive searches of PubMed, Ovid and Embase took place.  
The key words searched for in PubMed were: violence, conflict and health in Africa; 
violence; war OR civil conflict; war OR civil conflict and health facilities; human rights abuses 
OR war crimes; human rights abuses OR war crimes and health personnel and health facilities; 
assaults; assaults and health personnel and health facilities; war OR civil conflict, assaults, health 
personnel and health facilities; violence and health personnel and health facilities; war OR civil 
conflict and violence and health personnel and health facilities. Mesh terms included human 
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rights abuses, war crimes, health personnel and health facilities. After Ms. Folb concluded that 
there was not a lot of literature being pulled up by PubMed, citation chaining was started anew.  
After reading 28 articles published in journals such as the Lancet, the American Political 
Science Review, Conflict and Health, Social Science and Medicine, the Croatian Medical 
Journal, BMJ, the Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, International Studies 
Quarterly, Annals of General Psychiatry, the American Journal of Tropical Medicine and 
Hygiene, the British Journal of Psychiatry, the Journal of Traumatic Stress, Prehospital and 
Disaster Medicine and PLOS Medicine, the information was synthesized into models based on 
the four categories (economic and infrastructural, environmental, policy and social, (5, 6)) 
detailing the impacts of violent civil conflict. These models were then extrapolated to the 
specific case of Kenya and its post-election violence of 2007-2008. 
Reading these articles informed the second literature review, which was necessary to gain 
an understanding of the health-conflict field’s relationship to the 2007-2008 post-election 
violence in Kenya. The key words searched for in PubMed were: Kenya, violence, post-election 
violence, conflict and health. After collecting a handful of articles, citation chaining commenced. 
Citation chaining was done to such an extent for both literature reviews that articles already 
collected were being pulled up again. The author found two journal articles relating to the 
cholera outbreak, three articles relating to ART adherence, one article relating to birthweight and 
four articles relating to mental health issues such as PTSD. 
To supplement the information of the post-election violence, a search of the Daily 
Nation, Kenya’s most popular daily newspaper, and the BBC was done, resulting in two articles 
from the Daily Nation and three from the BBC. Reports issued by different departments within 
Kenya’s government, including the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation, the Ministry of 
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Medical Services, the National Bureau of Statistics, the Commission on Revenue Allocation, the 
Ministry of National Planning and Development and Parliament were collected. Grey literature 
was also obtained from Mercy Corps, the Hague Justice Portal, the Open Society Justice 
Initiative, the International Crisis Group, and the CSIS Global Health Policy Center. 
The studies detailing the four health outcomes of Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election 
violence (a cholera outbreak, low birthweight, interruptions in ART adherence and mental health 
issues such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) were chosen due to the frequency in which they 
appeared in PubMed’s search results. However, more importantly, they are specific examples of 
several of the four categories detailing the impacts of violent civil conflict. The cholera outbreak, 
low birthweight and mental health issues, including PTSD, are health outcomes related to the 
social impact of violent civil conflict. Interruptions in ART adherence and the cholera outbreak 
are health outcomes related to the infrastructural impacts. As more studies become available, 
health outcomes will be linked to the environmental and policy impacts of the 2007-2008 post-
election violence in Kenya.  
The methodologies of these studies included a case-control study(14), a mixed methods 
analysis that included a retrospective cohort analysis and key informant interview to complement 
the quantitative data(15), a retrospective cohort study(16), an analysis of the data from the 2008-
2009 Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey regarding all children born 15 months before and 
after the beginning of the 2007-2008 post-election violence(17), a retrospective assessment using 
two-stage cluster sampling(18) and a retrospective assessment using a random sample generated 
from a demographic surveillance system database(19).     
Kenya held presidential elections on March 4, 2013 and during its run-up, the 
international community, as well as Kenyan citizens, was waiting to see if violence would break 
 9 
out again. Due to the author’s Peace Corps service in Western Kenya from 2010 until 2012, this 
topic was of extra interest. Seeing the burned out buildings in Kakamega that still needed repair 
and feeling the tensions in her community when the International Criminal Court (ICC) brought 
charges against the original “Ocampo Six(20)” brought home the reality of the post-election 
violence’s impact. 
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4.0  AIM ONE RESULTS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 THE IMPACTS OF VIOLENCT CIVIL CONFLICT ON HEALTH OUTCOMES 
The most immediate and direct impact of violent civil conflict on health is death(9, 10, 21), 
which is measured quantitatively and qualitatively(2, 10).  However, the indirect effect of 
conflict on mortality is defined as “the number of deaths following a war minus the number of 
deaths that would have occurred in the same period if the war had not occurred(2).” The previous 
working ratio of indirect to direct conflict deaths was 9:1, emphasizing the complexity of violent 
civil conflict(2). However, Murray, King, Lopez, Tomijima and Krug (2002) found that this ratio 
had no actual basis(2), therefore this is an example of the erroneous use of numbers in the health-
conflict field. However, this is a distinct problem from that of unreliable data, which will be 
discussed further in the following section. Nevertheless, most indirect deaths from violent civil 
conflict are concentrated in the civilian population(5). These numbers are higher in groups that 
suffered discrimination pre-violent civil conflict, as they are likely to still be marginalized, 
resulting in more barriers to accessing health services(3).  
Levy (2002) (21) describes a different set of consequences related to violent civil conflict 
that are considered to be: 
“a) Long-term effects [including] physical disabilities to…psychological trauma; b) the 
social fabric of society [is damaged to the extent that] all activities of normal life are 
disrupted; c) the infrastructure of society…are destroyed…; d) war displaces people, 
making them refugees…or internally displaced persons…; e) the environment [is 
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damaged]; f) war and the preparation for war, drains human, financial, and other 
resources away from more productive activities; and g) war fosters a culture of violence.” 
(p.114-115). 
 
These disabilities can lead to long-term health needs, which are often left unmet in the aftermath 
of violent civil conflict because the health sector has deteriorated(5, 9). Morbidity due to 
communicable diseases such as cholera and HIV also increases, while the psychological stress of 
violent civil conflict can result in depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)(3, 9, 22). 
Negative reproductive health outcomes are also possible, including an increased number of 
stillbirths, prematurity and low birth-weight(9).  
 Quantifying these health outcomes depend on a country’s civil registration system(2). 
However as basic health services fail to function properly during times of violent civil conflict, 
cause of death data is inaccurate, if recorded at all. Since violent civil conflict tends to be highly 
politicized both within countries and without, it is easy for data to be misrepresented(2, 23). 
Nevertheless, available data can divide the impacts of violent civil conflict on health outcomes 
into four categories: infrastructural and economic, environmental, policy and social(5, 6, 21). 
These impacts are detailed below in four figures developed by the author, which are read left to 
right.  
4.1.1 Economic and Infrastructural Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
The first category describes the economic and infrastructural impacts of violent civil conflict 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 - Economic and Infrastructural Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
Health is impacted by the damage done to a country’s healthcare infrastructure(5, 10, 24). This 
includes physical damage to hospitals, clinics, and other medical facilities(5, 9, 10, 24-26); the 
death of medical personnel(9, 10, 24) and their flight to safer areas(10, 24). Other impediments 
to a functioning health sector include diminished training of staff, loss of continuous and 
complementary health care, reduction in monitoring and surveillance, lack of supplies and 
reduced infectious disease control(3, 10, 24). These impediments lead to lowered quality of care 
for patients and more medical errors leading to death or disability.      
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Rubenstein and 
Bittle (2010), there are four trends in violence against healthcare: violence against health care 
facilities, violence against the wounded and sick, violence against health care personnel and 
violence against medical vehicles(24, 27). Violence against healthcare facilities falls into four 
categories: deliberate targeting in order to gain military advantage; deliberate targeting for 
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political, religious or ethnic reasons; unintentional attacks, i.e. collateral damage; and the looting 
of drugs and medical supplies(24, 27).  Violence against the wounded and sick include blocking 
and interfering with medical access, discrimination in quality of care and discontinuation of 
care(24, 26). Violence against health care personnel includes kidnapping, killing, harassment, 
intimidation and arrest(24, 26), often resulting in their emigration(13). Unfortunately these types 
of attacks often occur in countries with the lowest number of health care workers(13). Violence 
against medical vehicles include interference with the vehicle’s transport, theft and 
tampering(24, 26). Medical vehicles include ambulances, aircraft and vehicles transporting 
medical supplies or equipment(24, 26).  
Following the end of the violent civil conflict, existing health infrastructure has to be 
repaired, further diverting resources to immediate need instead of future growth and 
development(3, 25). Violent civil conflict can have a five-year negative impact on economic 
growth(3), leading to inadequate funding for public health programs while hospital services are 
restored, medical personnel are trained and buildings are repaired(3, 8, 21, 25). Training medical 
personnel is a long-term commitment, which means in the short-term, patients will encounter a 
shortage of trained professionals. All of this combines to leave populations vulnerable to 
infectious diseases and other negative health outcomes because there are no comprehensive 
public health programs conducting monitoring and evaluation, surveillance or outreach 
campaigns(3, 8, 21, 25).     
Health is also impacted by a loss of funding during times of violent civil conflict(3, 5, 8, 
10, 21, 25). However, it is important to note that there is no clear link showing that military 
funding during times of violent civil conflict would necessarily have gone to the health sector if 
there was no conflict(25). Nevertheless during violent civil conflict, there are fewer resources 
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available and public health prevention is often put on the back burner, making it more difficult to 
meet emerging health challenges(3, 5, 21). These challenges include an increased number of 
epidemics due to the large-scale movement of civilians, soldiers and other combatants(3-5, 21). 
Instead of focusing on programs such as immunization campaigns and mobile voluntary testing 
and counseling, attention is turned towards curative care for injured civilians and combatants(3, 
10, 25). This reprioritization of health weakens any attempt to change health policy dealing with 
non-conflict related matters(9, 25).     
4.1.2 Environmental Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
The second category describes the environmental impacts of violent civil conflict (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 - Environmental Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
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Health is impacted by disruptions in transportation, the water and food supply and power 
grids(3-5, 10, 21, 22, 25). When transportation is interrupted, patients are unable to access 
medical care(3, 10, 12, 24, 26) and medical personnel are unable to report for duty(3, 5, 10, 24). 
Without electricity or water, hospitals are unable to perform basic functions, lowering quality of 
care(3, 12, 21, 26), which can result in death, disability or disease. When the food supply is 
interrupted due to transportation stoppages, individuals are unable to access food, which results 
in hunger(10). If left unresolved, hunger may become malnutrition(5, 10, 22, 25). In addition, the 
destruction of agricultural lands leads to lower harvest yields, which could push the population 
towards famine(21), making an already volatile situation  worse.    
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4.1.3 Policy Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
The third category describes the policy impacts of violent civil conflict (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 - Policy Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
Health outcomes “reflect the political competition among groups over investment and resource 
decisions regarding the level and distribution of health services(3).” In poorer countries, much of 
the population lives in rural areas with limited access to health care, including preventative 
services and campaigns(3). Due to the complexities of violent civil conflict, these populations 
are more vulnerable to increased risk of death, disease and disability(3). Those in charge of the 
political system are more likely to focus resources on their supporters rather than on the whole 
population(3), further limiting the growth and development of the health sector(25). This lowers 
the quality of care for patients and contributes to the breakdown of the regularly functioning 
health system. Those excluded tend to be in more need of public health services due to their 
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myriad of risk factors, among them poverty, illiteracy, and financial insecurity(3). In addition, 
violent civil conflict can cause a reprioritization of health needs from preventative to curative 
care, resulting in a reduction of public health programs, i.e. monitoring and evaluation, 
surveillance and chronic care. All of these factors lead to death, disability and disease. 
4.1.4 Social Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
The fourth category describes the social impacts of violent civil conflict (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 - Social Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict 
Social changes due to violent civil conflict also impact health outcomes. In some cases, portions 
of the population are forced to flee, either to other countries, becoming refugees; or within their 
own country, becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs). Both refugees and IDPs are at 
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higher risk of disease and death due to crowded living situations, low levels of sanitation, 
unclean water sources and malnutrition.  
Social changes also reflect health outcomes. Violent civil conflict dramatically and 
sometimes irreparably damages societies(3, 5, 8). Violent civil conflict based on pre-existing 
ethnic tensions can lead to systematic discrimination that reduces health outcomes and access to 
health care services(3, 5). Homicide and crime rates rise during this time, peaking in the first 
year after violent civil conflict’s end(3). This is in part due to the psychological 
transformations(3) societies undergo that normalize violence and killing(8), which cannot be 
automatically switched off when conflict is resolved. Among the most common perpetrators are 
young men(3), who then suffer psychological conditions that are often left untreated due to the 
limited functionality of the healthcare system. 
Violent civil conflict results in death, disease and disability. A reprioritization of health 
policy, a diversion of funds away from the health sector and the normalization of violence within 
a society also impacts health outcomes.  From the available literature, it is possible to create four 
categories detailing the impacts of violent civil on health outcomes: economic and 
infrastructural, environmental, policy and social(5, 6). These four categories are of particular 
importance to Kenya and its 2007-2008 post-election violence because it allows for the selection 
of specific health outcomes (a cholera outbreak, low birthweight, interruptions in ART adherence 
and mental health issues such as PTSD) to represent the larger analytical framework.  
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4.2 POPULATION LEVEL MEASURES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
The most common population level measures of health outcomes in the health-conflict field are 
Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy (HALE) and Disability-Adjusted Life-Years (DALYs). HALE, 
simply put, measures the quality of an individual’s health throughout their life. DALYs, 
meanwhile, measure the overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years lost due to 
disease, disability or early death. The Dirty War Index (DWI), while not measuring health-
outcomes, is a useful tool for “linking international humanitarian law to make public health 
outcomes directly relevant to prevention, monitoring, and humanitarian intervention for the 
moderation of war’s effects(23).” Retrospective surveys, census data, eyewitness accounts and 
media reporting while the sources of data for the above mentioned measures, have their own set 
of limitations that need to be considered. 
4.2.1 Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy (HALE) 
One way to measure health outcomes at the population level is described by Iqbal (2006) and 
Ghobarah, Huth and Russett (2003): HALE(5, 8) is a summary measure of health, previously 
known as Disability-Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE)(5). HALE “subtracts the number of 
years an individual is expected to spend with a disability as a burden of disease from the total life 
expectancy at birth(5)” and is then expressed as a single number using years of life as the unit(5, 
8). Since the measure is so information-sensitive, it relies heavily on vital registration of births 
and deaths as well as health surveys of death, disease and disability by age and gender(8). 
Statistical modeling is used when data is missing, resulting in standardization that allows for 
cross-country comparisons(8).   
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In his study, Iqbal (2003) looks at changes in HALE from 1990 to 2001 in all member 
states of WHO(5), using the independent variable conflict, which is broken down into “major” 
verses “intermediate war.” Major war results in at least 1,000 battle deaths in one year while 
intermediate war has at least 25 deaths in one year, but more than 1,000 deaths in the conflict’s 
history(5). Iqbal (2003) found that violent civil conflict alone may not significantly impact long-
term health outcomes, but as the number of conflicts increase, outcomes decline(5) as every 
additional conflict subtracts seven months off a country’s HALE(5). Infrastructure destruction, 
population movement and the diversion of resources away from the health sector(5) are all 
factors that contribute to a declining HALE. Additionally, Iqbal (2003) concluded that there is a 
significant short-term impact from violent civil conflict particularly when it fits the definition of 
major war(5). More access to international humanitarian assistance during times of violent civil 
conflict mitigates some of the long-term health consequences(5). However, long-term goals, such 
as rebuilding the health sector after violent civil conflict has ended, suffer.   
Ghobarah, Huth and Russett (2004) also use HALE to measure health outcomes, but the 
authors were careful to not confuse the impact of violent civil conflict with other economic and 
political variables(8). They ensured that their main independent variable, death from violent civil 
conflict, was not a proxy for other conditions that cause violent civil conflict by controlling for a 
variety of factors(8). In their study, the intensity and duration of conflict is particularly relevant 
as is how ethnicity affects health spending (8). Their results showed that countries involved in 
violent civil conflicts in the 1990s suffered a loss of healthy life across seven of the age-gender 
groups. At its worst, seven years of healthy life were lost per 100 people for every 100 civil 
conflict deaths(8).  
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HALE does have some limitations that must be considered when it is being used. First 
and foremost, it is an information-intensive process that requires vital registration data for births 
and deaths, as well as health surveys of death, disease and disability by age and gender(8). When 
this information is missing, statistical models are necessary to estimate outcomes. While this is 
not ideal, it is recognized by WHO and international agencies as the best available option for 
dealing with missing data. Since WHO only began to collect data in 1999, information for 
previous years is unavailable(8), limiting the scope of analysis for previous years.    
4.2.2 Disability-Adjusted Life-Years (DALYs) 
DALYs, or Disability-Adjusted Life-Years, are another way to measure health outcomes. 
DALYs “contain detailed information on 23 major diseases and conditions on categories of the 
population distinguished by gender and five age groups(3).” The age groups are 0-4, 5-14, 15-44, 
45-59 and 60 and above(8). DALYs “reflect the life years lost due to deaths from a particular 
condition contracted during the year plus the expected disability to be incurred by other people 
who suffered from the same condition in that same year(8).” According to WHO, DALYs 
measure “the gap between current health status and an ideal health situation where the entire 
population lives to an advanced age, free of disease and disability(28).” 
Ghobarah, Huth and Russett (2003) look at the impact of violent civil conflict on the 
incidence of death and disability by specific infectious disease(3). The authors find that an 
additional 8.01 million DALYs were lost worldwide in 1999 due the impact of violent civil 
conflict between 1991 and 1997(3).  They also hypothesize that “more DALYs are lost with the 
occurrence and increasing severity of civil conflicts within a country(3).” This is partially due to 
the displacement of large segments of the population, who are more susceptible to infectious 
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diseases, especially if they settle in IDP or refugee camps. In some countries that experience 
violent civil conflict, the crude mortality rates among refugees is five to 12 times higher than 
average(3). However, it is important to note that on average, tropical countries lose more DALYs 
from infectious diseases due to regular background conditions(3).  
A country undergoing violent civil conflict is strongly associated with an increased loss 
of healthy life in all age categories except for the elderly. For example, girls under five living in 
a country in 1999 that had experienced violent civil conflict in the preceding few years, lost on 
average 28.5 more DALYs per 100 girls compared to a country with no violent civil conflict 
experiences(3). 
4.2.3 The Dirty War Index (DWI) 
The Dirty War Index, or DWI, is “a data-driven public health tool that identifies rates of 
particularly undesirable or prohibited, i.e. “dirty,” outcomes inflicted on populations during war 
(i.e. civilian death)(23).” DWI is unique because it incorporates laws of war, i.e. “international 
humanitarian laws and customary standards regarding the treatment of civilians and 
combatants(23)” into its data collection method, which expands its interpretation, but only if 
cause of death information is available(23). DWI is calculated as follows: (Number of “dirty,” 
i.e., undesirable or prohibited cases/Total number of cases) x 100(23). An example of a DWI 
ratio is civilian mortality to combatant mortality, calculated as follows: (Number of civilians 
killed/Total number of civilians and combatants killed) x 100(23).       
Since DWIs are ratios, it is easy to compare them by country, by weapon use and by type 
of death, etc.(23). Military commanders can also evaluate loss of life from accepted methods of 
war, i.e. bombings. DWIs range from 0 (the best) to 100 (the worst). Hicks and Spagat (2008) 
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note that DWIs analyze whether the practice of war is just and not if the reason for war is 
just(23). For this reason, a DWI of three should not be ignored when compared to a DWI of 50 
as both measure undesirable outcomes(23). As a concluding note the authors specify that DWIs 
“only recognize the crucial matter of outcomes: the killing, injury, or abuse of individuals and 
populations who should be protected from war(23).”  
DWIs add a humanitarian and moral aspect to the scientific research methods of standard 
conflict research, facilitating a broader discussion base when looking at the impact of violent 
civil conflict on health outcomes. Additionally DWIs increase scrutiny on and accountability of 
those committing dirty war acts(11). Sondorp (2008) supports using DWIs because they uniquely 
express “public health findings as a ratio, in combination with a link to a specific international 
humanitarian law(29).” As such, DWIs fill the gap that previously existed between public health 
quantitative data and its use by human rights agencies and policymakers(29).     
DWI, while an innovative tool, has several limitations that need to be considered. Before 
interpreting a DWI, it is necessary to discover the ratio’s source. Inaccurate sources create 
inaccurate DWIs, which could have political ramifications depending on its importance. Another 
limitation is data availability. Data from severe conflict areas are likely to be both scarce and 
unreliable, preventing DWIs from being fully utilized. Taback (2008) suggests that selection 
bias, missing data and censoring are other limitations(30). Since the data collected are from 
secondary sources such as media reports and hospital records, they are likely not as accurate as 
data from primary sources(30), resulting in inaccurate DWIs. Missing data can be modeled, but 
censoring can lead to underreporting. These factors could cast doubt on the appropriateness of 
using DWIs for policy and legal purposes(30). 
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4.2.4 Sources of Data for HALE, DALYs and DWI 
Retrospective surveys, census data, eyewitness accounts and media reporting are among the 
sources of data for HALE, DALYs and DWI. Retrospective surveys can be administered to 
assess sibling, parental or spousal survival(2). Among the limitations when using retrospective 
surveys is recall bias. Under the stress of fleeing, IDPs and refugees may remember conditions 
and causes of death differently, inadvertently skewing data. However, it is possible that 
participants are deliberately prevaricating in order to protect themselves or family members(4). 
Retrospective surveys are also costly, time-consuming and require intensive training and 
experience(4). For these reasons, it is extremely difficult to undertake one in an insecure setting. 
Survey teams and participants are also at risk from the general atmosphere of insecurity, as well 
as from reprisals by government or opposition forces(4). 
Data can be also be collected from official government reports, such as census(2). 
However health information systems, such as civil registration, often cease to function(2) during 
times of violent civil conflict, necessitating a reliance on estimates, eyewitness accounts and 
media reporting. These sources of information often inaccurate, with eyewitness’ accounts 
affected by the stress of the situation and the accuracy of media reporting dependent on the outlet 
and intended audience. This uncertainty is reflected in the ratio of people injured to killed in 
modern conflicts, which ranges from 1.9 to 13.0(2).  
Despite this, these are often the best available sources of information, especially when 
researchers have difficulty accessing conflict zones. HALE and DALY are internationally 
recognized health outcome measurements used by international organizations such as WHO and 
the World Bank. Due to these organizations’ credibility, the use of HALE and DALY are 
unlikely to be challenged in the future. Therefore studies using these measurements are valid as 
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long as their limitations are mentioned by researchers. Since DWIs are used to measure the 
undesired “dirty” outcomes during times of violent civil conflict(23) and place a value judgment 
on the ratios, they are unlikely to gain international recognition and use. However, they are still a 
useful tool for humanitarian agencies and lawmakers looking to incorporate a way to combine a 
public health perspective with international customary practice.  
4.3 EXISTING GAPS IN DATA 
A crucial gap in the current health-conflict literature is the lack of new research(13, 26). 
Mortality surveys have rarely been done for modern conflicts(29) resulting in reliance on faulty 
or outdated data. This is due to the difficulty of conducting on the ground research during times 
of conflict(4, 10, 13, 26). As a result, the role of conflict epidemiologists is becoming 
increasingly important. However by using retrospectively administered surveys among clearly 
delineated samples of IDPs and refugees, a lack of information about conditions that forced 
dislocation occurs(4). This can be remedied by including survey questions addressing this gap. 
Conflict epidemiologists also fill the gap that exists in the humanitarian literature on the 
reporting of mortality due to conflict, by providing “rigorously assembled scientific data(4),” 
which then serves as an evidence base for policymaking. Zwi (2004) also recognizes the gap 
between evidence and policy(9). Since the health-conflict field is relatively new, there has been 
little effective collaboration between disciplines to produce sound practices and solutions. 
Collecting both quantitative and qualitative data will pave the way for “better practice(9).” 
Qualitative data will help express the voice of those negatively impacted(12, 31), while 
quantitative data will give numbers about them.  
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Orbinski, Beyrer and Singh (2007) detail two current reporting models to record human 
rights abuses(31), which if applied to conflict epidemiology could be very helpful.  In the first of 
these, the state-reportage model, organizations report directly to the government(31). However, 
these reports can be ignored. In the second model, wide-dissemination, agencies report to the 
international community as well as governments in order to raise accountability(31). These 
models provide a good framework for reporting, but need scientific evidence to be credible. For 
this reason it is very important for conflict epidemiologists, public health researchers and health 
workers collaborate. 
 There is currently no systematic way to track types of attacks on hospitals(27), limiting 
data analysis that would support emergency preparedness. In 2009, WHO launched a program to 
ensure hospitals’ safety during violent civil conflict, but did not require attacks to be tracked(27), 
missing a valuable opportunity. Due to the unavailability of data, there has not been a systematic 
review of targeted attacks in over 15 years(27). However in 2011, the ICRC published a report 
detailing types of violence, including the targeting of hospitals, but only on the 16 countries in 
which they operate(13, 26). The report’s methodology is weak due to an overreliance on media 
and humanitarian agencies, but it successfully raised awareness about the difficulties hospitals 
face(13).  
This lack of data creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult to hold governments or 
international agencies accountable for ignoring short and long-term damage to the health sector. 
This also means that this is not a priority topic in the international arena(12, 13). Without this 
data, there is no way to provide evidence showing that security is a prerequisite to health(12). 
Currently available reports do not provide enough information on the scope of the problem, 
because they underestimate the number of attacks(13, 27).  
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While not an international priority in and of itself, when children become involved there 
are certain protections in place. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has recognized 
that children are unfairly impacted by violent civil conflict, particularly when it comes to 
accessing hospitals for medical care. As such, the Office of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict lists six grave violations(13, 32), among 
which are attacks against schools and hospitals. Grave Violation Five states that “parties to a 
conflict must not attack schools or hospitals, or other education or medical facilities ordinarily 
used by children(32).” Those who ignore these Six Grave Violations may find themselves facing 
crimes against humanity or war crimes(32). The 4th Geneva Convention, Article 48, Additional 
Protocol I provides this protection and gives the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction 
to try these crimes(32). These violations are taken seriously because they obstruct the right of 
children to attain the “highest…standard of physical and mental health(32).”   
That this is considered a grave violation is reflected in the April 2011 Report by the 
Secretary-General, Agenda item 64 (a) “Promotion and protection of the rights of children” 
which states “hospitals have also borne the brunt of conflicts around the world…leading to the 
disruption of the delivery of health services and/or closure of hospitals(33).” The Secretary 
General suggested “expanding the gateway to the annexes of my report to include parties that 
attack schools and/or hospitals(33),” which if actualized, paves the way for more in-depth data 
collection by conflict epidemiologists, humanitarian agencies and public health researchers.   
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5.0  AIM TWO RESULTS: KENYA CASE STUDY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Kenya is a geographically, ethnically, linguistically and meteorologically diverse country. It is a 
country of contradictions: laughter and anger, efficiency and inefficiency and life and death. The 
current population is approximately 40.5 million people with 22 percent living in urban areas(34, 
35). There are approximately 42 tribes in Kenya, of which the largest are the Kikuyu (22 
percent), Luhya (14 percent), Luo (13 percent) and Kalenjin (12 percent)(34, 35). While the 
official languages are Kiswahili and English, there are a variety of dialects and sub-dialects 
spoken by the different tribes. The main religions are Protestantism (47 percent), Roman 
Catholicism (23 percent) and Islam (11 percent)(34, 35). Kenyans take religion very seriously 
with Sundays devoted entirely to church-going and prayer.    
The majority of the land in Kenya is arid or semi-arid with only 20 percent arable(35). 
The country is divided into lowlands and highlands with varying climates(35). Generally 
speaking there are two periods of rainfall interspersed with dry seasons; however, this has been 
changing over the past couple of years(36). Notable physical features include the Maasai Mara, 
Mount Kenya, the Great Rift Valley, Lake Victoria and Lake Nakuru. The capitol, Nairobi, is the 
largest city followed by Mombasa and Nakuru(37).     
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Kenya’s main exports are tea, horticultural products and coffee and its largest trading 
partners are Uganda, Rwanda and the Netherlands(34). The largest contributors to its GDP are 
agriculture and forestry; wholesale and retail trade, repairs; and manufacturing(38). The currency 
is the Kenyan shilling, which experienced 14 percent inflation in consumer prices over the past 
year(34).  
Following a spate of attacks on tourists in Coast Province in August and September 2011, 
Kenya invaded Somalia in October 2011 to prevent further attacks by Al Shabaab, a group that is 
funded by Al-Qaeda(34). Since the invasion, there have been numerous grenade attacks in public 
places, such as bus stops and nightclubs in Nairobi. Most of the attacks in Nairobi have occurred 
in Eastleigh, an area populated mainly by Somali immigrants. Similar attacks have occurred in 
Garissa, a city in North Eastern Province with a large Somali population.     
5.2 THE STATE OF KENYA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
As a result of the 2008 power-sharing agreement, the Ministry of Health was split into the 
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation and the Ministry of Medical Services(39). Despite the 
split being purely political in order to give both parties equal representation in the government, it 
has had some administrative benefits. The two divisions, while complimentary, have two distinct 
ministerial strategic plans(39). The Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation’s goal is to improve 
the efficiency of public health and sanitation programs, while embracing new innovations to 
foster economic growth(40), while The Ministry of Medical Services’ goal is to reduce health 
inequities and improve health outcome indicators(41).   
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There is a shortage of trained healthcare professionals that is overburdening the 
healthcare system(42), leading to long wait time for patients; low morale among staff(43), which 
impacts quality of care; and a general lack of respect for patients. Facilities are chronically 
understaffed with physician density at 1.4 per 10,000 population and nursing and midwifery 
personnel density at 11.8 per 10,000 population(44). This highlights what Rubenstein (2012) 
writes: that the impact of violent civil conflict on healthcare services are felt most in countries 
that start out with lower numbers of health care workers(13).  
Many doctors are going into private practice, leaving to work overseas or choosing to 
work in cities for more money at better facilities(43). Two separate strikes were held by doctors 
and nurses in December 2011 and March 2012 over low pay and too many patients. These strikes 
crippled the healthcare system and resulted in a high number of deaths because no one would 
treat patients. Overall, the shortage of trained healthcare professionals has an impact on mortality 
rates, particularly maternal, perinatal, neonatal and child. 
5.3 A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY 
Kenya achieved self-rule from England on June 1, 1963 and gained independence on December 
12, 1963(35). These dates are public holidays known as Madaraka Day and Jamhuri Day 
respectively. Independence came after a prolonged armed resistance known as the Mau Mau 
Rebellion in the 1950s(35). Among the many political parties found in Kenya are PNU (Party of 
National Unity), formerly headed by Mwai Kibaki; KANU (The Kenya African National Union), 
formerly headed by Uhuru Kenyatta; and ODM (The Orange Democratic Movement), headed by 
Raila Odinga(45). Support for these parties tends to be determined by tribe: PNU and KANU 
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have strong Kikuyu bases and ODM is traditionally Luo. The March 4, 2013 presidential 
elections further complicated matters because they caused a massive reorganization of parties 
and alliances.   
Kenya was divided into eight provinces and 158 districts up until March 5, 2013, when 
the system devolved into 47 counties(46), following the mandate set out in the new constitution 
ratified on August 27, 2010. The constitution also abolishes the position of prime minister and 
establishes a bicameral legislature(28). This devolution will benefit Kenya in the long run 
because it streamlines the government hierarchy into only two divisions: the national government 
and the county government, instead of the previous five. The goal of having only two divisions is 
to eliminate redundancies and increase efficiency.   
5.4 THE 2007-2008 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Kenya has long been considered a bastion of democracy in East Africa, with the United Nations 
even locating one of their four main branches in Nairobi. However, this fell apart after the 2007 
presidential elections. On December 27, 2007, Kenya held presidential elections with two 
forerunners – Raila Odinga of ODM and incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of PNU. Odinga lead 
by one million votes as the count concluded, but a few hours later, President Kibaki was declared 
the winner(47). Allegations of election fraud led to violent clashes throughout Kenya from 
December 27, 2007 until February 28, 2008, when Kofi Annan brokered a power-sharing deal 
between ODM and PNU(47). During this time between 1,133 and 1,200 people were killed; 
3,561 were injured and approximately 600,000 were internally displaced(34, 47, 48). As of 
February 2013, there were still 100,000 IDPs due to the post-election violence(49)  
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No discussion of the post-election violence is complete without an understanding of the 
ICC trial and its defendants. In February 2008, the Kenyan Government established the 
Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), informally known as the Waki 
Commission after the Court of Appeals chair, Judge Philip Waki(50). The Waki Commission 
published its findings in October 2008, stating that if the government failed to establish a tribunal 
comprised of national and international judges to investigate and prosecute the responsible 
parties of the post-election violence within six months, the findings would be given to the 
ICC(47, 51). In February 2009, the government vetoed a bill establishing a local tribunal and the 
case was handed over to the ICC in July 2009(47, 51). 
The three defendants in the two cases are Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto and Joshua 
Arap Sang(52). Charges were confirmed against these three by Pre-Trial Chamber II in January 
2012(52). Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta, served as Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance under President Mwai Kibaki(52). He is an alleged 
“indirect co-perpetrator” who is charged with “crimes against humanity of murder, forcible 
transfer, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts(52).” Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, is alleged to have 
directed the Kikuyu-led gang known as ‘Mungiki’ to attack ODM supporters(52). William Ruto, 
the Member of Parliament from Eldoret and former senior member of ODM, is charged with the 
same crimes. He allegedly prepared a plan of violence against PNU supporters a year before the 
elections took place and executed it through the assistance of Joshua Arap Sang(52). Sang, a 
radio host in Eldoret with KASS FM at the time of the 2007 elections, is charged with 
contributing to “crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer and persecution(52).” He 
did this by sharing coded messages about times and locations of attacks in Nandi to ODM 
supporters via his radio show “Lene Emet(52, 53).” On March 11, 2013 charges were dropped 
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against Francis Muthaura, originally one of the four defendants, by the ICC for lack of 
evidence(54). 
In 2012, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto formed the Jubilee Coalition to run for 
political office(55), with the understanding that if they won, Kenyatta would serve as President 
and Ruto as Deputy President. Despite violating Kenya’s newly ratified Constitution by 
maintaining his position as Deputy Prime Minister(56) while under investigation by the ICC, 
Kenyatta was allowed to run for president(57). On March 9, 2013, he was declared the winner of 
the presidential elections with 50.07 percent of the vote over his main rival Raila Odinga’s 43 
percent(58). When the ICC trial resumes in July 2013, Kenyatta will be a sitting president and 
Ruto his deputy, which blurs the lines of responsibility for the post-election violence.   
As a result of the post-election violence, Kenya has suffered long-term economic, 
environmental, political, social impacts(59). The loss of revenue resulting from the closure of 
businesses during the post-election violence was a particularly devastating economic impact(59). 
Environmental impacts were felt through the destruction of land and property that led to food 
insecurity(59). Political divisions were turned aside as leaders were forced to work with each 
other in the new coalition government. In the name of unity, Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, joined forces 
with Ruto, a Kalenjin, and ran for president(55). However, there were murmurs that in the name 
of peace, freedom of speech was violated since no one wanted to be seen as instigating trouble. 
The social impacts were expressed through the erosion of the sense of community that Kenyans 
prided themselves on as neighbors turned on each other. Even as communities struggled to 
rebuild, pre-existing ethnic cleavages were deepened(59).    
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5.4.1 Post-Election Violence by Province 
Among the most common forms of violence during this time was looting, burning of houses and 
shops, beatings, murder, forced circumcision and rape. Of the perpetrators, 70 percent were 
youth, but these youth accounted for only five percent of the total youth population(59). This is a 
hopeful statistic as it suggests violence was concentrated in a small segment of the population. 
The main provinces impacted by the post-election violence were Rift Valley, Nairobi, Coast, 
Nyanza and Western(60).  
5.4.1.1 Rift Valley Province  
Rift Valley Province was the site of some of the worst violence(59), due to the pre-existing 
ethnic tensions between the Kalenjins and Kikuyus. These tensions boiled over into attacks 
against neighbors and community members which included the gang raping of women and the 
killing of men with pangas (machetes)(61). Attacks were concentrated in Nakuru and Naivasha, 
damaging their local economies. Both are important economic hubs: Nakuru is one of the main 
transit points out of Kenya, while Naivasha is home to the cut flower industry that supplies 
Europe. 
5.4.1.2 Nairobi 
The violence in Nairobi was particularly well-organized, especially in Kibera, Nairobi’s largest 
slum. Mungiki orchestrated attacks against Luos, Luyhas and Kalenjins, forcing them to leave 
behind their property in exchange for their lives(62). Joining the fray were the police, who 
actively took sides against those living in Kibera(62). 
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5.4.1.3 Coast Province 
The majority of the violence in Coast Province was directed against the minority Kikuyu and 
Kisii communities, who supported PNU(62), as the majority of the Province’s voters supported 
ODM. The tensions in Coast were also exacerbated by religion, as most inhabitants are Muslim 
with a minority Christian population. 
5.4.1.4 Nyanza Province 
During the post-election violence, Shikanga, Mutonga, Abade, Amwayi, Ope, Limo, Mintz, 
Quick, Breiman, and Feikin (2009) (14) report that Nyanza Province suffered from a 
“lack of public transportation, multiple work stoppage “mass action” days, and 
impromptu roadblocks on rural roads, greatly complicating access to health 
facilities…Many staff in health facilities…who had left their posts to go to their home 
areas to vote and celebrate Christmas were unable to return. Health facility staff of rival 
ethnic backgrounds also fled their posts…out of concern for their personal safety. Health 
facilities experienced shortages in critical supplies during the months after the 
election…Staff and supply shortages were most acute in January and February during the 
height of the post-election violence, but persisted into March and April….” (p.1088) 
5.4.1.5 Western Province 
In Western, violence was concentrated in Mumias and Kakamega with large portions of both 
towns being razed and burned. Western is mainly occupied by the Luhya tribe, who had 
supported ODM; so it was natural they targeted the minority Kikuyu and Kisii tribes who had 
supported PNU(62). The violence against these minority tribes was different in that its main 
intent was to drive them out and destroy their property(62). In addition, government facilities 
were targeted in Western more so than in other Provinces(62). 
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5.5 POPULATION LEVEL HEALTH OUTCOMES 
Recent studies have looked at the impact of the post-election violence on health outcomes among 
different populations, including people living with HIV/AIDS and IDPs. These populations were 
more susceptible to negative health outcomes, including a cholera outbreak(14), low 
birthweight(17), interruptions in ART adherence(15, 16) and mental health problems such as 
depression and PTSD(18, 19). These four health outcomes were chosen because they represent 
the larger analytical framework introduced in section four and offer the Kenyan healthcare sector 
important considerations for future periods of violent civil conflict.  
The cholera outbreak, low birthweight and mental health issues such as PTSD are 
specific health outcomes of the social impact of violent civil conflict as represented in Figure 4 – 
Social Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict. The interruptions in ART Adherence and the cholera 
outbreak are specific health outcomes of the infrastructural impacts of violent civil conflict as 
represented in Figure 1 – Economic and Infrastructural Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict. In 
addition, these particular studies have certain methodological advantages despite their limitations 
that make their use all the more compelling.   
5.5.1 Cholera 
From January to April 2008, a cholera outbreak spread among ten districts in Nyanza Province. 
The two conditions necessary for a cholera outbreak were present at this time: first there were 
large geographic shifts in the population leading to cramped living quarters, which contributed to 
the breakdown in basic hygiene and sanitation. Secondly, cholera was already present in the 
population and the previous factors contributed to its rapid spread(63). The Kenya Ministry of 
 37 
Health reported 790 confirmed cases and 53 deaths, with a Case Fatality Rate (CFR) of 6.7 
percent(14). This is much higher than the 3.8 percent CFR recorded by WHO from 2000 to 
2007(14). Shikanga, Mutonga, Abade, Amwayi, Ope, Limo Mintz, Quick, Breiman, and Feikin 
(2009) hypothesize that this discrepancy is due to the post-election violence(14). As the outbreak 
progressed (and as time moved further away from the onset of violence), the CFR declined until 
it reached 2.8 percent in April 2008(14).  
Compounding the situation, were hospital staff and supply (including IV fluids and ORS) 
shortages.  Shikanga, Mutonga, Abade, Amwayi, Ope, Limo, Mintz, Quick, Breiman, and Feikin 
(2009) write that “compared with optimal pre-election staff numbers, at the time of the case-
patient admission, hospital administrators reported a 49% deficit in nurses, 46% deficit in 
clinical officers, and 33% deficit in medical officers(14).” These personnel shortages meant that 
hospitals were even more ill-equipped to deal with outbreaks of infectious diseases. This could 
be seen in the median wait time of 18 hours between admission and death(14). Additionally, 
underreporting of cholera deaths was highly likely due to the breakdown in “passive health 
facility-based surveillance(14).” Even in periods of non-violence, civil registration coverage of 
causes of death is between 25 and 49 percent(44), well below WHO standards for accurate 
reporting(64). 
Considering these cholera deaths in larger analytical framework, it becomes clear that 
these deaths represent the infrastructural and social impacts of violent civil conflict on health 
outcomes. Using Figure 1 – Economic and Infrastructural Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict, it is 
possible to see that an increase in infectious diseases, i.e. cholera, is a result of the breakdown of 
the regularly functioning health sector. Circumstances in this particular cholera outbreak which 
may be attributed to the breakdown of the regularly functioning health sector are a shortage of 
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medical supplies, medical personnel and a reduction in monitoring and surveillance 
programs(14).    
Using Figure 4 – Social Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict, it becomes apparent that this 
cholera outbreak was also a result of the crowded living situations and lowered levels of hygiene 
and sanitation due to large geographic shifts of the population(14). Since cholera was already 
present in the population, these cramped unsanitary conditions became the ideal breeding ground 
for the bacterium. Infectious disease outbreaks do not occur in a vacuum – they are heavily 
influenced by external factors, and in this case are reflective of the infrastructural and social 
impacts of violent civil conflict.  
Shikanga, Mutonga, Abade, Amwayi, Ope, Limo Mintz, Quick, Breiman, and Feikin’s 
2009 study detailed the cholera outbreak in Western Kenya, which occurred after the 2007-2008 
post-election violence(14). One of the methodological limitations of their case-control study is 
recall bias. The authors found that it was possible that participants recalled deaths more than 
survivals, contributing to their higher CFR(14). In addition, the authors did not directly ask 
participants if the post-election violence impacted their ability to access medical care(14). 
However, this was also a strength because cholera cases are often underreported, resulting in an 
underestimation of the burden of cholera mortality and morbidity(14). This fact was one of the 
justifications as to why this study was selected to serve as an example of the infrastructural and 
social impacts of violent civil conflict on health outcomes. The complexities involved in the 
cholera outbreak reflect the complexities in the linkages shown by Figures 1 and 4.  
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5.5.2 Low Birthweight 
Women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violent civil conflict. Taking this a step 
further, Bell, Prata, Lahiff and Eskenazi (2012) hypothesize that the resulting social, economic 
and political disruptions of the 2007-2008 post-election violence are “associated with poorer 
health outcomes in the population, in particular, the health of pregnant women and their 
offspring(17).” Times of violent civil conflict can cause maternal stress, which is associated with 
reduced birthweight(17). Additionally, each “unit increase of prenatal life event stress was 
associated with” a 55g to 99g decrease in infant birthweight(17), suggesting that pregnant 
women who experienced the post-election violence would give birth to lower birthweight infants 
than usual.  
This is an important consideration because currently eight percent of children born in 
Kenya suffer from low birthweight, which can lead to infant morbidity and mortality(35). This 
study is the first of its kind to “examine political violence and its association with poor 
pregnancy outcome(s)…(17).” These poor pregnancy outcomes were further impacted by the 
declining health sector and limited patient access to basic resources(17). The 2007-2008 post-
election violence can be considered a “population-wide stressor(17)” with far-reaching 
implications for the future health of mothers and infants.  
Bell, Prata, Lahiff and Eskenazi (2012) stated that “pregnancy during or immediately 
after the Kenyan Crisis will be associated with lower birthweight infants, particularly among 
infants of Kikuyu women living in the high conflict regions (i.e. Nairobi and Rift Valley)(17).” 
Using the 2008-2009 Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), Bell, Prata, Lahiff and 
Eskenazi (2012) compare all children born in the 15 months before and after the beginning of the 
post-election violence (i.e. December 27, 2007 to February 28, 2008) and categorize them as 
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“exposed” or “unexposed” infants(17). Being an “exposed” infant was significantly associated 
with having a lower than average birthweight than being an “unexposed” infant(17) was. The 
most significant association was found among Kikuyu women living in a high conflict region 
who were exposed during their second trimester(17). These women’s infants had average 
birthweight reductions of 564.4g(17). 
These findings are important for the Kenyan government to consider as the country 
moves forward with future presidential elections. Despite a peace agreement in place, the social 
impacts of violent civil conflict can be experienced for months and years afterwards. As will be 
seen in the studies looking at ART adherence, having a contingency plan to focus care on the 
most vulnerable populations is essential to mitigate further detrimental health outcomes. 
Referring back to the larger analytical framework represented by Figure 4 – Social 
Impacts of Violent Civil Conflict, it is possible to see low birthweight as a health outcome of the 
social impacts of violent civil conflict. Violent civil conflict causes society to undergo 
psychological changes, which results in the normalization of violence and leads to more 
experiences with violence. Exposure to violence puts added stress on pregnant women which can 
result in negative reproductive health outcomes, such as low birthweight, prematurity and 
stillbirths(17). 
Bell, Prata, Lahiff and Eskenazi’s 2012 study of the linkages between civil unrest and 
birthweight uses the 2008-2009 Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey as the data source. 
Survey weights were used to account for the complex sampling design (17), allowing the authors 
to account for the exclusion bias of not including those without a recorded birthweight(17). This 
study is important because it the first to “investigate the association between political violence 
and the ‘stress/poor pregnancy outcome’ model in a low-resource setting(17).” For this reason, 
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this study was selected to highlight the social impacts of violent civil conflict on health 
outcomes.  
5.5.3 Interruptions in ART Adherence 
The next group of studies analyzes the impact of the post-election violence on ART adherence. 
The first two studies look at children because not much is known about how they are affected by 
violent civil conflict(15, 16). The acute and long-term health impacts are seen more prominently 
in children, as they are more susceptible to abandonment, malnutrition and communicable 
diseases(16). Children who are HIV positive are even more vulnerable to disruption in care as 
they can contract opportunistic infections or develop viral resistance to their medications(16). It 
is for these reasons that looking at the health of child populations can be indicative of adult 
health. 
The first study in this group looks at clinic attendance and ART adherence in Western 
Kenya among children 14 years and younger(15). This study is important because it is among the 
first to examine the provision of care for HIV positive children during times of conflict(15). 
Vreeman, Nyandiko, Sang, Musick, Braitstein, and Wiehe (2009) examined a child population, 
numbering over 10,000, enrolled in USAID-Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare 
(AMPATH) clinics using quantitative and qualitative measures. This included a retrospective 
cohort analysis and key informant interviews with healthcare providers(15). Of the 10,000; 2,585 
were eligible because they had been seen in AMPATH’s clinics between October 27 and 
December 25, 2007. They were then tracked to see if they attended their regularly scheduled 
appointments on a monthly basis from December 27, 2007 to April 15, 2008.  
 42 
Surprisingly, 93 percent of patients returned to care; of those on ART, 95 percent 
returned(15). This may be partially due to AMPATH’s handling of the chaotic situation: staff 
members met on a daily basis; they sent response teams into IDP camps to track patients; they 
publicized instructions for patients on reaching care and they established a 24-hour hotline to 
make this easier(15). Fear for personal safety was identified as the major barrier for those who 
did not return to the clinics(15).  Also mentioned were a lack of resources and irregular 
transportation(15). Additionally, Vreeman, Nyandiko, Sang, Musick, Braitstein, and Wiehe 
(2009) suggest that most of these individuals belonged to targeted minority tribes(15). However, 
due to the sensitive nature of the post-election violence, the study did not identify these 
tribes(15). 
Healthcare providers faced their own set of barriers in returning to work, including the 
inability to obtain food and having their homes burned. In some cases they were not “able to 
provide care in particular clinics because of the perceived risk to members of their ethnicity in 
that community and experiencing mistrust from patients because of the providers’ ethnicity(15).” 
However due to AMPATH’s trusted position within the community, AMPATH’s clinics were 
able to re-open within a week of the violence’s commencement(15). 
The next study in this series looked at the same population, but added a third time period 
from April 16 to December 31, 2008 to assess the post-election violence’s long-term impact(16). 
Yoder, Nyandiko, Vreeman, Ayaya, Gisore, Braitstein, et al. (2012) found that children on ART 
had lower levels of loss-to-follow-up (2.6 percent) compared to children not on ART (6.8 
percent)(16). In this study, the minority tribe, identified as the Kikuyus, were found to have 
higher levels of loss-to-follow-up, regardless of whether they were on ART or not(16). Similar 
barriers discussed included a lack of resources and transportation(15, 16). However, AMPATH’s 
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quick response the post-election violence may have mitigated negative long-term impacts since 
loss-to-follow-up levels were so low. This response is a good framework for other clinics to 
emulate.   
The third study looked at disruptions in HIV treatment (i.e. ART) with a secondary focus 
on the population’s mental health status due to the widespread post-election violence(18). The 
study took place ten weeks after the elections at twelve health facilities and three IDP camps in 
Rift Valley, Nyanza and Central Provinces, among adults ages 15 and above who were on ART 
or followed other chronic medication regimes(18). This resulted in a total of 1,294 patients and 
336 IDPs(18) at 12 health facilities and nine IDP camps(18). These twelve health facilities 
served 22 percent of the national ART patient population(18), making for a representative 
sample.  
Only nine percent of patients were found to have not returned to their routine health 
facility after the post-election violence(18). However, only 6.3 percent of patients with HIV did 
not return, which was not enough to be statistically significant(18). Rift Valley had the highest 
percent (25) report that they were unable to access care during the 2007-2008 post-election 
violence, possibly due to the higher rate of patient displacement (22 percent) there compared 
with the other two Provinces(18). One possible explanation for these low levels is that these 
health facilities, anticipating the business of the holidays and the election, had doctors gave out a 
two month supply of ART to patients instead of the regular one month(18).  
In terms of mental health, few patients personally experienced violence (2.5-14 percent) 
but many had witnessed it (18-59 percent)(18). Those who experienced violence were 
significantly more likely to suffer from depression and anxiety symptoms, but having HIV was 
not found to be associated with these symptoms(18). IDPs had higher rates of personally 
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experiencing violence and subsequently higher rates of depression and anxiety symptoms, 
indicating a need for expanded access to treatment for mental health issues during times of 
violence(18). 
These findings indicate that the 2007-2008 post-election violence had a short-lived 
negative impact on health services which translated into the disruption of only a few patients’ 
ART adherence(18). These negative impacts were mitigated by the facilities’ foresight in 
dispensing a two month supply of medication rather than the regular one month. AMPATH 
clinics did the same, resulting in lower rates of ART disruption among HIV positive children. 
These actions suggest that having a contingency plan in place for emergency situations will help 
prevent wide-spread medication interruptions(15, 16, 18).    
Interruptions in ART adherence is a health outcome of the larger framework detailing the 
infrastructural impacts of violent civil conflict as shown in Figure 1. Violent civil conflict causes 
the regularly functioning health sector to break down, which includes shortages of medications 
and supplies and a reduction in chronic care programs, such as those supporting people living 
with HIV/AIDS.  
These three studies all used a variation of the retrospective study design. As a result, they 
all share recall bias as one of their limitations. Vreeman, Nyandiko, Sang, Musick, Braitstein, 
and Wiehe’s 2009 study identifies an underestimation of the number of patients receiving 
medical care due to faulty record keeping the first weeks after the 2007 election(15). While the 
small drop in ART adherence levels is a good sign of the strength of AMPATH’s precautionary 
measures, the clinical implications of this drop are not well-known due to the lack of routine 
testing of viral loads and resistance(15). The results of this study are not particularly 
generalizable(15), but provide an in-depth analysis for the Kenyan Ministry of Public Health and 
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Sanitation and the Ministry of Medical Services. The follow-up study by Yoder, Nyandiko, 
Vreeman, Ayaya, Gisore, Braitstein, and Weihe (2012) faced the same limitations and had the 
same benefits to offer the two Ministries(16).   
The 2009 study by Bamrah, Mbithi, Mermin, Boo, Bunnell, Sharif, and Cookson 
identified several additional limitations, which included the fact that the study took place later 
than initially anticipated(18). Additionally, information was not collected about those who had 
still not returned to health care facilities and the impact of the 2007-2008 post-election violence 
could have had significant effects at the district or sub-district level that were not represented at 
the provincial level(18). Since convenience sampling was used, the results are not 
generalizable(18), but are useful to the two Kenyan ministries of health.   
5.5.4 Mental Health: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Witnessing or being a victim of the 2007-2008 post-election violence profoundly impacted 
individuals and Kenyan society as a whole. The causes and the effects of PTSD have been well-
studied, but only in the context of developed countries. In lesser developed countries there is not 
a lot of research available. This is why Harder, Mutiso, Khasakhala, Burke and  Ndetei’s (2012) 
study is so important – it looks at the determinants of PTSD in the context of a lesser developed 
country, specifically Kenya(19). Studying the youth population is necessary because childhood 
and adolescent PTSD, if left untreated, can lead to chronic mental disorders and other adverse 
outcomes(19). Most cases of PTSD in Kenya are undiagnosed and untreated as there are only 31 
registered psychologists and 14 psychiatrists for a population of over 40 million(34, 35, 65). 
Not every traumatized youth will develop PTSP, but experiencing multiple traumas and 
being female increases a person’s risk(19). Since the post-election violence was wide-spread, it 
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was possible to randomly select a youth population that had experienced high levels of violence, 
including rape, forced circumcision, and murder(19). Of the 552 youth selected, 47 percent had 
experienced more than five traumatic events; of these, 79 percent reported that at least one of the 
traumatic events had occurred during the post-election violence(19). The overall prevalence of 
PTSD in this sample was 12 percent six months after the 2007-2008 post-election violence 
ended(19), much higher than the prevalence rate of five percent as reported by Seedat, Nyamai, 
Njenga, Vythilingum and Stein (2004)(66). In this instance, being female was not significantly 
associated with an increased likelihood of developing PTSD(19).  
Impoverished youth from informal settlements do not typically have access to advanced 
mental healthcare, leaving them at the mercy of their situation and experiences. As a result, it is 
imperative that mental health services be incorporated into primary care. Emphasizing this is the 
12 percent prevalence rate of PTSD within this population(19). As these individuals enter the 
workforce, it is important for any mental health disorder to be diagnosed and treated so that their 
working capacity and earning potential are not negatively impacted. 
 Relating PTSD to the larger analytical framework outline by Figure 4 – Social Impacts of 
Violent Civil Conflict, it becomes apparent that this is a health outcome of the social impacts of 
violent civil conflict. Violent civil conflict causes society to undergo psychological changes, 
resulting in the normalization of violence, which leads to homicide and crime rates peaking in 
the first year after violence ends and an increased number of experiences with violence. PTSD is 
a result of both of these factors.   
Harder, Mutiso, Khasakhala, Burke, and Ndeteir’s (2012) study relies on data collected 
retrospectively from a random sample selected from a demographic surveillance system database 
operatized by the CDC(19). Along with the set of limitations related to a retrospective study 
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design, the authors identified a few other limitations. The first was the transient nature of the 
informal settlements and their inhabitants, making it more difficult to differentiate between a 
missing house number and a family that was not able to be located(19). This difference was 
important to the study because participants were randomly selected from housing clusters(19). 
Another limitation was the use of a Western-style assessment of PTSD that did not incorporate 
local constructs(19). However, every PTSD diagnosis was confirmed by a Kenyan psychologist. 
Since this study happens to be the only one that examine PTSD in a developing country and its 
results match others from developed countries, lends towards its accuracy(19). 
A cholera outbreak, low birthweight, interruptions in ART adherence and mental health 
issues such as PTSD are four health outcomes of Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence that 
represent the infrastructural and social impacts of violent civil conflict. Despite each study’s 
respective limitations, several of them are the first of their kind to detail specific health outcomes 
of violent civil conflict in a developing country. These studies are useful for the Kenyan Ministry 
of Public Health and Sanitation and the Ministry of Medical Services in their preparation to 
mitigate negative health outcomes in future instances of conflict.   
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6.0  LIMITATIONS 
The first aim of this thesis was to synthesize the current relevant literature on conflict as it relates 
to health outcomes, both in the short and long-terms. This has been accomplished to the best of 
the author’s ability. However, there are several limitations that merit discussion. First of all, the 
field of emergency preparedness is largely ignored. This was done on purpose as it was beyond 
the scope of the primary research question. However, this field does play an important part in 
mitigating the negative impacts of violent civil conflict on health outcomes. With emergency 
preparedness plans in place, a population’s level of risk of disease, disability and death is 
reduced.  
Secondly the author may have missed literature not found in the PubMed searches that 
would have complemented the discussion presented here. It is also possible that literature 
negating the discussion was missed as well. Certain articles were unobtainable due to restricted 
access, but the author did her best to find similar articles or articles by the same author in order 
to rectify this. Since the field is not exceedingly large, these missing articles should not pose 
problems to the discussion’s veracity and strength. 
The 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya occurred approximately six years ago, 
which has been enough time for certain studies to be carried out, but others are likely still in 
process. Due to this short timeframe, the true long-term impact of the violence has yet to be 
calculated using HALE and DALYs. These measures are an important quantitative component 
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for detailing health outcomes. DWIs would be a useful tool to look at how and by whom deaths 
were caused, but it is beyond the author’s ability to calculate these ratios. It is possible due to the 
relatively short timeframe between the conclusion of the violence and the writing of this thesis 
that studies are currently being carried out that would have further informed the discussion. In 
addition the health-conflict literature did not cover environmental degradation to an advanced 
degree. This is another component that would help explain the food security situation following 
the 2007-2008 post-election violence.     
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7.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Approximately 310,000 deaths were caused by conflict in the year 2000 with more than half 
occurring in sub-Saharan Africa(2). Multiple researchers have found that the largest number of 
conflict deaths occur in children and adolescents, but a quarter are among women(2, 3). WHO 
has estimated that 0.70 percent of the global burden of disease in the year 2000 was due to 
conflict(2). Since this places conflict-related deaths well below other burdens, it is not 
considered a priority by the international community.        
The existing literature in the health-conflict field is diverse and identifies many 
components of violent civil conflict and its impact on health outcomes. The most immediate 
health outcome of violent civil conflict is death, while the longer-term health outcomes include 
disease and disability, which are not as well-studied(9, 10, 21). These impacts can be divided 
into four categories: infrastructural and economic, environmental, policy and social(5, 6, 21). 
However despite this versatility, there are still stark gaps in existing data. There has not been a 
comprehensive review of conflict-ridden countries and their health outcomes in over 15 
years(27), leading to a reliance on outdated data and inaccurate data collection methods such as 
eyewitness accounts or media reporting. 
Nevertheless, this gap allows conflict epidemiologists to flourish. Conflict 
epidemiologists specialize in collecting data during “relatively acute situations affecting large 
civilian populations, usually involving a combination of war or civil strife, food shortages and 
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population displacement, resulting in significant excess mortality(4).” By collaborating with their 
fellow public health researchers, these gaps can slowly be filled.   
In Kenya this topic is particularly relevant as its 2007-2008 post-election violence 
resulted in between 1,133 and 1,200 deaths; 3,561 injuries and approximately 600,000 internally 
displaced persons(34, 47, 48). Of the 600,000 internally displaced persons, there were still 
100,000 IDPs as of February 2013(49). Most of these health outcomes were concentrated among 
women and children, two of the most vulnerable populations during times of violent civil 
conflict. The health outcomes of the 2007-2008 post-election violence included a cholera 
outbreak(14), low birthweight(17), interruptions in ART adherence(15, 16) and mental health 
problems such as depression and PTSD(18, 19).  
Seventy percent of the post-election violence’s perpetrators were youths(59), which helps 
explain why Harder, Mutiso, Khasakhala, Burke and Ndetei (2012) found a PTSD prevalence 
rate of 12 percent among this population six months after the post-election violence ended(19). 
After presidential elections were held on March 4, 2013, Kenyans and the international 
community watched to see if violence would break out again. It did not.  
Moving forward, more research is need in the health-conflict field, particularly in 
countries such as Kenya which may not have a recent history of violent civil conflict. This is 
important for any future attempts to mitigate the negative impacts of violent civil conflict. If it is 
known which populations are the most vulnerable and how they will be impacted in the short- 
and long-term, it becomes easier to organize and implement emergency preparedness plans. 
Additionally, it is important that future research examine the weight of evidence behind the four 
categories of impacts detailed in the four figures. As more research percolates among the 
international community, the health-conflict field will slowly become a priority.  
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